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January 1996
Plural Perils
Roger Bernhardt
California mortgage law is a source of endless astonishment to the rest of the country.
Elsewhere, a fearful lender takes security for a loan in order to improve its position and to
increase its remedies; here, however, a lender that takes a mortgage finds its options reduced as a
result of our one-action rule (CCP §726). Some recent cases seem to be creating a related version
of that same principle of reduced rights in multiple-security situations, making it considerably
more risky to hold two pieces of security rather than just one.
Aspen Enters., Inc. v Bodge
Aspen Enters., Inc. v Bodge (1995) 37 CA4th 1811, 44 CR2d 763 (reported at p 16), arising
from the Fourth Appellate District, is a gentle introduction to this theme. A major difference
between California’s Commercial Code and its real estate foreclosure statutes is that every aspect
of a real estate trustee sale is legislatively (and minutely) regulated, whereas the Commercial
Code eschews such detailed regulation in favor of an overriding “commercial reasonableness”
standard.
In the mixed personal property/real property security context, where the two regimes come
together, Com C §9501 permits a lender to deal with the collateral either through separate sales
of the real and personal property, or by a unified sale of both together. The legal difference is
that, in separate sales, the personal property is governed by Commercial Code rules, whereas in a
unified sale the personal property is governed by the real estate statutes. This statutory
arrangement might lead a naive lender to believe that it can trade the vagueness of judicially
determined commercial reasonableness for the safe harbors of legislative details by choosing a
unified sale and having the personal property security recharacterized as real estate. Aspen
Enters., however, holds that the threshold choice of unified versus separate foreclosure must
itself be commercially reasonable. Commercial reasonableness is a factor even when the real
estate system is selected; the commercial reasonableness standard can be bypassed only when it
is commercially reasonable to do so.
It would certainly have been silly for the Aspen Enters. lender to sell its debtor’s tire store
inventory at the same unified sale of the debtor’s residence, but the decision does not stop there.
Even in the classic hotel foreclosure situation, a court could rule that the lender should not have
forced potential buyers to make a blanket bid covering the hotel’s soap and towels as well as the
real estate. The unified sale may wind up forcing lenders to comply with the Commercial Code
and the real estate rules at the same time (as the supreme court’s recent decision in Ford &
Vlahos v ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. (1994) 8 C4th 1220, 36 CR2d 464, seems to portend).
Western Sec. Bank v Superior Court*
Western Sec. Bank v Superior Court (1995) 38 CA4th 1241, 45 CR2d 664 (reported at 18 CEB
Real Prop L Rep 336 (Nov. 1995)), is the most demonstrative (and notorious) of the decisions
showing judicial antipathy to creditors’ use of multiple security. The Second Appellate District
went far beyond simply denying retroactivity to new CCP §580.5, which upholds letters of credit
in real estate financing and declares a legislative intent to abrogate the first Western Sec. decision
(see Murray, What Should I Do With This Letter of Credit?, 17 CEB Real Prop L Rep 133 (Apr.
1994)). The Western Sec. opinion pointedly signaled the judges’ displeasure at the legislation,
declaring it unwise and warning that compliance (even in prospective cases) may generate other
*

On January 18, 1996, the California Supreme Court granted review of the Western Sec. case (S037504), and the 1111 Prospect
case (S038657).

judicial obstacles. Footnote 15 of the opinion ominously observes that, even when a lender draws
on its letter of credit before, rather than after, foreclosing, “[t]his might well cure an existing
default or require a new notice of default which would provide additional rights to the borrower.”
38 CA4th at 1263 n15. Piecemeal collection steps performed uninterruptedly may now be headed
for trouble; if each collection step represents a potential cure of the default or a mandate for a
new notice of default, the overall process will be considerably lengthened.
Bank of S. Cal. v Dombrow
Bank of S. Cal. v Dombrow (1995) 39 CA4th 1457, 46 CR2d 656 (see Muñoz, Bank of S. Cal.
v Dombrow: The Specter of Equity Continues To Haunt Lenders, p 8), like Aspen Enters., also
came from the Fourth Appellate District. Dombrow is the opinion that should worry lenders
most. Its decision to give guarantors the protection of the fair market value limitations of CCP
§580a (see California Mortgage and Deed of Trust Practice §§4.17–4.22 (2d ed Cal CEB 1990)
may significantly impair recourse to all multiple security. For over 50 years (since Hatch v
Security First Nat’l Bank (1942) 19 C2d 254, 120 P2d 869), our courts have held that the fair
value principle does not apply to multiple security because the sale of additional security is not
the same as a deficiency judgment. Because a guaranty is generally regarded as a kind of
additional security, guarantors have consequently suffered from the same lack of fair value
protection.
It may be correct that most cases have ignored the fact that the distinction between guarantors
and sureties has been statutorily abolished; but the reasons that Dombrow gives for then applying
CCP §580a to guarantors—that trustee sales are nonredeemable and that CCP §580a refers to an
“obligation” rather than merely to a “note”—are no less true for all additional security. After the
sale of an asset, Dombrow may require a lender with multiple security to return to court for a fair
value hearing before the lender can collect on its next asset (letter of credit, debtor’s tire
inventory, or whatever).
Indeed, the lender may have greater difficulty going after inanimate additional security than in
going after a human guarantor. Dombrow allowed for the possibility of a guarantor fair value
waiver; in light of the Cathay Bank saga, however (Cathay Bank v Lee (1993) 14 CA4th 1533,
18 CR2d 420 (Gradsky guarantor defense waiver held invalid)), we are sure to see no end of
problems in that regard. Further, no court that decides that a debtor’s additional security is
protected by the fair value rule is going to permit the debtor personally to waive that protection
(until the legislature tells it otherwise, and even then the outcome is doubtful).
1111 Prospect Partners, L.P. v Superior Court*
1111 Prospect Partners, L.P. v Superior Court (1995) 38 CA4th 570, 45 CR2d 338 (reported
at 18 CEB Real Prop L Rep 335 (Nov. 1995)), also arising from the Fourth Appellate District,
comes almost as a surprise in holding that a draw on a letter of credit as a first step after default
(e.g., a preforeclosure draw) does not bring the one-action rule sanction into play (which would
prohibit any subsequent foreclosure of the real property security). It represents the only instance
in these four cases in which a lender gained an undisputed advantage from being multiply
secured.
Of course, a contrary decision in 1111 Prospect, especially when combined with Western
Sec.’s treatment of the reverse facts, would have really boxed lenders in: To first foreclose on the
real estate would bar recourse to the letter of credit because of CCP §580d, and to first draw on
the letter of credit would bar foreclosure on the real estate because of CCP §726! But then, is
such an outcome really inconceivable in California?

